Generalized Nash equilibrium problems have become very important as a modeling tool during the last decades. The aim of this survey paper is twofold. It summarizes recent advances in the research on computational methods for generalized Nash equilibrium problems and points out current challenges. The focus of this survey is on algorithms and their convergence properties. Therefore, we also present reformulations of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem, results on error bounds and properties of the solution set of the equilibrium problems.
INTRODUCTION
In a Nash equilibrium problem (NEP for short), N players compete with each other. Every player is allowed to choose a strategy from his strategy set in order to minimize his objective. The objective of a player may depend on both the player's and the rival players' strategies. A vector of strategies for all players is called Nash equilibrium or simply solution of a NEP if none of the players is able to improve his objective by solely changing his strategy. NEPs were defined in 1950 by John F. Nash [60, 61] . The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP for short) was introduced in 1952 by Gerard Debreu [12] . In a GNEP, the strategy set of each player may also depend on the strategies of the other players.
The main focus of this paper is on algorithms for the solution of GNEPs and related issues. Therefore, globally convergent methods as well as methods with fast local convergence are presented. We concentrate on recently developed algorithms and well known methods for which new convergence results have been obtained in the last years. There is a very recent survey paper [21] that gives a detailed description of some algorithms, mainly for some equation-based reformulations of GNEPs.
From the theoretical point of view our focus lies on structural properties of the solution set of GNEPs and on error bound results. The latter play an important role for the local convergence analysis of several algorithms. For other theoretical results, in particular on existence, we refer to the survey papers [28] and [20] and references therein. In [28] also a detailed overview on the history of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem can be found. Stochastic and timedependent GNEPs are not in the scope of our paper, see [46] for a recent book.
The paper is organized as follows. In the remaining part of the Introduction the generalized Nash equilibrium problem is described and basic definitions are given. Reformulations of GNEPs by means of other problem classes are presented in Section 2. Such reformulations turn out to be useful from the theoretical as well as from the algorithmic point of view. Section 3 is devoted to local error bound results for GNEPs, whereas Section 4 reviews structural properties of the solution set of GNEPs. Section 5 deals with globally convergent algorithms and, in Section 6, we describe methods with locally fast convergence for the solution of GNEPs and some globalization techniques.
Problem statement
Let us consider a game of N players ν = 1, . . . , N . Each player ν controls his strategy vector Each player ν has an objective function θ ν : R n → R that may depend on both the player's decision variables x ν and the decision variables x −ν of the rival players. With respect to the practical setting, the objective function of a player is sometimes called utility function, payoff function or loss function. Moreover, each player's strategy x ν has to belong to a set X ν (x −ν ) ⊆ R n ν that is allowed to depend on the rival players' strategies. X ν (x −ν ) is called feasible set or strategy space of player ν. In many applications the feasible set is defined by inequality constraints, i.e., for each ν = 1, . . . , N , there is a continuous function g ν : R n → R m ν so that
For any given x ∈ R n , let us define
Note that x ν ∈ X ν (x −ν ) holds for all ν = 1, . . . , N if and only if the fixed point condition x ∈ X (x) is satisfied.
If we fix the rival players' strategies x −ν , the aim of player ν is to choose a strategy x ν ∈ X ν (x −ν ) which solves the optimization problem
The GNEP is the problem of finding x * ∈ X (x * ) so that, for all ν = 1, . . . , N , θ ν (x * ,ν , x * ,−ν ) ≤ θ ν (x ν , x * ,−ν ) for all x ν ∈ X ν (x * ,−ν )
holds. Such a vector x * is called generalized Nash equilibrium (NE for short) or simply solution of the GNEP. By SOL(GNEP) we denote the set of all solutions of the GNEP. If the feasible sets of all players do not depend on the rival players' strategies, the GNEP reduces to the classical Nash equilibrium problem.
Further definitions and notation
Among all GNEPs, player convex GNEPs play an important role. We call a GNEP player convex if, for every player ν and for every x −ν , the set X ν (x −ν ) is closed and convex and the objective function θ ν (·, x −ν ) is convex. This is a slightly weaker notion than the player convexity used in [45] , where X ν (x −ν ) is given by (1) with continuous and componentwise convex functions g ν (·, x −ν ).
A further useful class of GNEPs is described by the existence of a nonempty set X ⊆ R n with the property
for all ν = 1, . . . , N and all x −ν . Members of this class are often called GNEPs with common or shared constraints. Proposition 1.1 (see [74] ). For GNEPs satisfying (4) the following equivalences hold:
x ∈ X (x) ⇔ x ν ∈ X ν (x −ν ) for all ν = 1, . . . , N ⇔ x ∈ X. Proposition 1.1 tells us that in the case of a GNEP with shared constraints the fixed points of the point-to-set map x → X (x) coincide with the elements of X . However, note that for given x ∈ X , the sets X and X (x) need not coincide. More precisely, neither X (x) ⊆ X nor X ⊆ X (x) hold in general.
An important subclass of GNEPs with shared constraints are the jointly convex GNEPs. A GNEP is called jointly convex if, for every player ν and for every x −ν , the function θ ν (·, x −ν ) is convex and if (4) holds with a nonempty, closed, and convex set X ⊆ R n . The set X is often described by
where G : R n → R M denotes a componentwise convex function. Then, (4) becomes
Obviously, a jointly convex GNEP is also player convex. To deal with more complicated cases, several authors (e.g., see [18] ) consider the set
This set coincides with the set of the fixed points of the point-to-set map x → X (x). In the case of shared constraints (4) we have W = X .
Proposition 1.2 (see [18]).
For any GNEP with W defined by (6) the following equivalences hold:
Note that, for given x ∈ W , the sets W and X (x) need not coincide. Furthermore, W is nonconvex in general, even if the GNEP is player convex.
Finally, let us state some basic notation. Throughout, · indicates the Euclidean vector norm. Sometimes, the maximum vector norm · ∞ is used. By B δ (z) := {x ∈ R n | x − z ≤ δ} the closed ball around z ∈ R n with radius δ > 0 is denoted. As before, the set of all solutions of a GNEP is denoted by SOL(GNEP). More general, we will use SOL( ) to denote the solution set of a certain problem . For a given function F its Jacobian is indicated by J F. We sometimes 
REFORMULATION OF GNEPS
This section is devoted to several reformulations of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem. Such reformulations turn out to be useful to prove theoretical results, for instance on existence. Even more important, reformulations are often the key to the design of numerical algorithms for the solution of GNEPs.
Variational reformulations
Quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) and, as a subclass, variational inequalities (VIs) play an important role for understanding and solving GNEPs. Before discussing relations between QVIs, VIs, and GNEPs let us introduce the corresponding notions. To this end, let F : R n → R n be continuous and let K : R n ⇒ R n denote a point-to-set map so that K (x) is closed and convex for all x ∈ R n . Then, the problem of finding x * satisfying
is called quasi-variational inequality and denoted by QVI(K , F). If, for some closed convex set
) is called variational inequality and denoted by VI(K , F). To link QVIs to GNEPs let us define
assuming that θ 1 , . . . , θ N are C 1 -functions. If the point-to-set map X : R n ⇒ R n given by (2) is closed and convex then QVI(X, F) is well defined. Developing methods for broader classes of QVIs is challenging but seems quite helpful for the solution of GNEPs.
If the GNEP is a NEP, i.e., if for every ν there is a set X ν ⊆ R n ν such that X ν (x −ν ) = X ν for all x −ν , the above theorem tells us that, under a convexity assumption, any solution x * of the NEP is a solution of the variational inequality VI( N ν=1 X ν , F), and vice versa. More interestingly, we will see in Subsection 4.2 that solutions of an appropriate VI may provide certain solutions of a GNEP. A basic result in this direction is The set X in the previous theorem is connected to a jointly convex GNEP by its definition, see Subsection 1.2. Under the conditions of Theorem 2.2, any solution of VI(X, F) is called normalized Nash equilibrium or variational equilibrium. By means of the Nikaido-Isoda function this notion can be extended to the case of only continuous functions θ 1 , . . . , θ N , see [72, 74] , for example.
Reformulations based on Nikaido-Isoda functions
Throughout this subsection it is assumed that the functions θ ν are at least continuous. For some parameter α ≥ 0, let the map α : R n × R n → R be defined by
Taking α = 0, this is the classical Nikaido-Isoda function [63] (NI function for short). 0 is also known as Ky-Fan function. For α > 0, α is the regularized Nikaido-Isoda function introduced in [74] . To understand the benefit of the (regularized) NI function let
Theorem 2.3. Let the GNEP be player convex. Then, it holds for α ≥ 0:
(c) x * is a NE if and only if x * is a fixed point of the point-to-set map x →Ŷ α (x).
This theorem summarizes results in Theorem 2.2 and Proposition 2.3 of [74] , where the GNEP is assumed to be jointly convex. However, the proofs directly extend to player convex GNEPs, see [18] . For the classical NI function (α = 0), the assertions (a)-(c) even hold without player convexity. Given x ∈ X (x), the setŶ 0 (x) might be empty. Only under strong convexity assumptions for the functions θ ν it can be shown thatŶ 0 (x) is single-valued. Based on Theorem 2.3, several (quasi-) optimization and fixed point problems can be formulated. In general, the resulting problems are nonsmooth. The terminus "quasi" emphasizes the situation that the description of the feasible region X (x) itself depends on the varying variable x. Taking into account Proposition 1.1, a "real" but still complicated (nonsmooth) optimization problem can be considered for GNEPs with shared constraints. Then, a vector x * is a NE if and only ifV 0 (x * ) = 0 and x * is a global solution of min
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are defined for any x ∈ R n . Then, connections to normalized NE can be established.
Theorem 2.4 (see [74] ). Let the GNEP be jointly convex. Then, it holds for α ≥ 0: Theorem 2.4 leads to smooth constrained optimization and fixed point reformulations for jointly convex GNEPs. In particular, x * is a normalized NE if and only if V α (x * ) = 0 and x * is a global solution of min
Moreover, under the conditions in Theorem 2.4 (e), the objective in (10) becomes continuously differentiable. Results similar to those of Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 were presented in [54] for a modification with a player related regularization of the NI function.
A smooth unconstrained reformulation is given in Theorem 2.5 (see [74] ). Let the GNEP be jointly convex. Then, it holds for β > α > 0:
Thus, if the GNEP has at least one normalized NE, the set of global minimizers of V αβ is equal to the set of normalized NE.
Taking into account Proposition 1.2, a similar unconstrained reformulation (with smoothness properties) can be established which characterizes Nash equilibria of certain player convex but not necessarily jointly convex GNEPs, see [18] . For W according to (6) , let S denote the closure of the convex hull of W . Moreover, with
the following result is known.
Theorem 2.6 (see [18] ). Let the GNEP be player convex with X ν (x −ν ) given by componentwise convex functions g ν (·, x −ν ) according to (1) . Moreover, suppose that W = ∅ and X (x) = ∅ for all x ∈ S. Then, it holds for β > α > 0 and c > 0:
Note, that a constrained reformulation for player convex GNEPs can be obtained from problem (9) when replacing the functionV 0 and the set X byV α (α > 0) and W according to Proposition 1.2 (see [45] for detailed studies).
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
Throughout this subsection we assume that the objective functions θ ν are continuously differentiable for all ν = 1, . . . , N and that the feasible sets of the players are defined by inequality constraints. More precisely, for each player ν = 1, . . . , N and each vector x −ν let X ν (x −ν ) be given by
with C 1 -functions g ν : R n → R m ν . To keep it simple, we assume that only inequality constraints appear, cf. Remark 2.1 below. Let x * be a solution of the GNEP. Then, for every ν = 1, . . . , N , the vector x * ,ν is a solution of the optimization problem (3) with x −ν := x * ,−ν . Therefore, if an appropriate constraint qualification is satisfied in x * ,ν , there are vectors λ * ,ν ∈ R m ν such that (x * ,ν , λ * ,ν ) satisfies the classical Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
where
Conversely, if the GNEP is player convex, it is well known that any solution of the KKT system (12) yields a solution of the optimization problem (3) with x −ν := x * ,−ν . Concatenating the KKT systems of all players we obtain the KKT system associated to the GNEP, namely
Summarizing our above observations we have 
Remark 2.1. If equality constraints appear in the GNEP, they can easily be incorporated in the KKT system (13). Doing this, assertion (a) of Theorem 2.7 remains true, whereas assertion (b) can be kept in case of affine equality constraints.
It is well known that the KKT system (13) can be reformulated as a nonlinear and possibly nonsmooth system of equations. Such reformulations may be important for the construction of algorithms for the solution of (13) as well as for the analysis of properties of the solution set. The nonsmooth reformulation
is, for instance, used in [27] and [49] . The minimum has to be taken componentwise. Obviously, a point z * = (x * , λ * ) is a solution of (13) if and only if H min (z * ) = 0. A further useful reformulation of the KKT system associated to a GNEP is given by the following constrained system of equations:
Obviously, a point (x * , λ * ) is a KKT point of the GNEP if and only if (x * , λ * , −g(x * )) is a solution of (15) . The reformulation (15) was used in [16] and [15] to describe and analyze algorithms for the solution of (13).
Next, let us consider a jointly convex GNEP. According to its definition (see Subsection 1.2), the feasible set (11) of player ν is given by
Due to the convexity assumptions for the constraints and the objective functions, the KKT conditions (13) are sufficient conditions.
In Theorem 2.2 it was stated that any solution of the variational inequality VI(X, F) associated to a jointly convex GNEP is also a solution of the GNEP. Now, with some multiplier vector ∈ R M , the KKT system of VI(X, F) reads as
The next theorem states relations between solutions of a jointly convex GNEP, of the KKT system (13) for this GNEP, of the variational inequality VI(X, F) associated to the GNEP, and of the KKT system (16) belonging to VI(X, F). For a proof see [26] . Theorem 2.8 also characterizes the normalized NEs defined in Subsection 2.1.
ERROR BOUNDS
Throughout this section we consider GNEPs where, for ν = 1, . . . , N , the optimization problem of player ν is given by
Moreover, we also assume that the problem functions θ ν and g ν are C 2 . From systems of equations, optimization problems, or variational inequalities it is well known that error bounds can be very useful for the design and convergence analysis of algorithms and for deriving theoretical results, see, e.g., [23, 32, 47, 64] . However, the field of error bounds for GNEPs is in its beginning.
Our aim is to provide recent local error bound results for the solution set of the KKT system (13) of a GNEP. To this end, let Z denote the set of all points z = (x, λ) that solve (13) . Throughout this section we suppose that z * = (x * , λ * ) is an arbitrary but fixed element of Z . In Section 2.3 we mentioned that (13) can be reformulated by
with z = (x, λ) and H min defined by (14) . We say that H min provides a local error bound at z * if there are δ > 0 and ω > 0 such that
where dist[z, Z ] := inf{ z − ξ | ξ ∈ Z } denotes the (Euclidean) distance of z to the set Z .
In the first part of this section we will state conditions that imply the existence of δ and ω such that (17) holds. This assertion follows from a well known result on polyhedral multifunctions [70] , see also [27, Theorem 8] . Although the particular class of GNEPs in Proposition 3.1 may appear in applications, one is interested in dealing with more general cases. A first result is Theorem 9 in [27] . For its description the map H * min needs to be defined by deleting certain rows from H min . More in detail, H * min is obtained from H min by successively removing rows min{λ
Note that H * min has less components than n + m if at least one constraint being active at x * is shared by more than one player. Note that the strict complementarity assumption guarantees that H min and H * min are continuously differentiable in a certain neighborhood of z * . In particular, the Jacobian J H * min (z * ) is well defined.
In [49] a weaker condition is derived that also ensures that H min provides a local error bound at z * . In particular, this condition does not require strict complementarity at z * . Before stating the result some further definitions are needed. For simplicity of presentation, let us assume that only shared constraints occur, i.e., that there is a function G : R n → R M with g 1 = · · · = g N = G. Then, with the index sets
where [49] and nearly at the same time the paper [15] was submitted which also deals with sufficient conditions for a local error bound to hold. There, another reformulation of the KKT system of a GNEP is considered, namely the constrained system of equations
where H , z, and are defined in (15) . Due to the differentiability assumptions for the GNEP in the beginning of this section, H is C 1 . This might be an advantage compared to H min . By the definition of H , one cannot expect that H provides a local error bound of the form (17) with H instead of H min . Rather, one has to intersect the neighborhood of z * with . For the sake of simplicity, we state the result from [15] only for GNEPs with shared constraints. Z H denotes the solution set of the constrained system (15).
Theorem 3.3. Consider a GNEP with shared constraints only and suppose that for any i
If δ, ω > 0 exist so that (18) holds H is said to provide a local error bound at z * on .
STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES
This section is devoted to some structural properties of generalized Nash equilibria. The next subsection is based on [13, 14] and highlights certain generic properties of solutions, in particular related to their isolatedness or nonisolatedness. Subsection 4.2 deals with approaches for characterizing all or a subset of solutions of a GNEP.
Generic properties
We consider GNEPs where, for every ν = 1, . . . , N , the ν-th player's optimization problem is given by min
with C 2 -functions θ ν : R n → R, g ν : R n → R m ν , and G : R n → R M . The common constraints G(x) ≤ 0 are shared by all players while the inequalities g ν (x) ≤ 0 describe individual constraints.
Let us first explain what is meant by "generically satisfied property". Obviously, every GNEP is characterized by its defining problem functions θ ν , g ν and G. We assumed that all these functions are twice continuously differentiable. Let the space C 2 (R n ) of twice continuously differentiable functions be endowed with the Whitney topology and the product space of GNEP defining functions
with the product-Whitney topology. For the definition of the Whitney topology we refer to [13, 14] and references therein. We say that a property of GNEPs is satisfied generically if, regarding the Whitney topology, there is an open and dense subset of the space of GNEP defining functions such that the property holds for all instances of this subset.
In the following we first consider a subclass of GNEPs, namely problems without common constraints. Thus, for every ν = 1, . . . , N , the optimization problem of player ν is
Let us fix ν for the moment and let x * ,−ν be given. Recall that the KKT conditions of problem (20) with x −ν := x * ,−ν are given by (12) . A solution (x * ,ν , λ * ,ν ) of (12) is called a nondegenerate KKT point of problem (20) if the following conditions are satisfied:
-LICQ is satisfied in x * ,ν , -strict complementarity holds in (x * ,ν , λ * ,ν ),
Concatenating the KKT systems of all players the KKT system of the GNEP
is obtained, cf. Section 2.3. A solution (x * , λ * ) is called a nondegenerate KKT point of the GNEP if, for every ν = 1, . . . , N , (x * ,ν , λ * ,ν ) is a nondegenerate KKT point of the optimization problem (20) with x −ν = x * ,−ν . The x-part of a nondegenerate KKT point of a GNEP is not necessarily an isolated Nash equilibrium (although the points x * ,ν are isolated solutions of the optimization problems (20) , given x * ,−ν ). Thus, to ensure isolatedness, a further condition is needed. To this end, for a KKT point (x * , λ * ) of the GNEP, the function F 1 : R n+m → R n+m is defined by
. . .
By m we still denote the total number of (individual) constraints, i.e., m = N ν=1 m ν . Every solution (x, λ) of the nonlinear system F 1 (x, λ) = 0 with λ ≥ 0 and g(x) ≤ 0 is a KKT point of the GNEP. The converse is generally not true. However, if (x * , λ * ) is a nondegenerate KKT point of the GNEP, at least every solution of (21) In the case of GNEPs where common constraints occur, i.e., where the ν-th players' problem is given according to (19) it cannot be expected that every solution of the GNEP provides a KKT point, see [14, Example 2] . This example is stable with respect to small perturbations of the defining functions. This motivates to consider Fritz-John (FJ) points instead of KKT points. Let ν ∈ {1, . . . , N } and x * ,−ν be arbitrary but fixed. Then the FJ conditions of problem (19) with x −ν := x * ,−ν are given by There is a relation between the set of FJ points of the GNEPs and the solution set of the nonlinear system F 2 (x, γ ) = 0, where
where, for y ∈ R, y + := max{0, y} and y − := min{0, y} and, for y 1 , . . . , y p ∈ R,
The next proposition is about the characterization of the set of FJ points of the GNEP by means of the nonsmooth function F 2 . For a proof we refer to [14, Lemma 2.1].
Proposition 4.1. For a GNEP and x
* ∈ R n , the following assertions are equivalent.
Before we state the next result let us define the sets
Theorem 4.2. Generically, for a GNEP with common constraints the following properties are satisfied.
and that all matrices V ∈ ∂F 2 (x * , γ * ) have full row rank.
This result follows from Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.3 in [14] , where the reader can also find the definition of a Lipschitz manifold. The main conclusion of the assertion (b) of Theorem 4.2 is that generically FJ points of a GNEP are not isolated.
In [14] a Newton-type projection method for the solution of the system F 2 (x, γ ) = 0 is provided. In each step of this method a linear system of equations must be solved, for details on convergence properties of the resulting algorithm see [14] .
Description of all solutions of a GNEP
As it can already be seen from simple examples, the solution set of a GNEP may consist of nonisolated solutions. Therefore, ways for characterizing all (or a subset of all) solutions of a GNEP by means of a parametrized simpler problem are useful, particularly within applications where one is interested in having a good approximation of the solution set. The definition of suitable parametrized problems is still a big challenge. At least for jointly convex GNEPs results exist. Below, we will review some of them. To this end, let us consider F : R n → R n given by (7) and let us define 
SOL(VI(X, F b )) ⊆ SOL(GNEP).
This theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.2 since SOL(GNEP) does not change if θ ν is replaced by b ν θ ν for ν = 1, . . . , N . Using this theorem one can (in principle) obtain a certain subset of solutions of the GNEP by solving the simpler variational inequalities VI(X, F b )) for all b ∈ (0, ∞) N . This subset is the set of all normalized Nash equilibria of the GNEP. To compute other solutions as well by means of a VI one can try to substitute the set X or the map F by a suitably parametrized object. This idea was dealt with in [59] . To review a first result let F ω : R n → R n be defined by 
SOL(VI(X, F ω )).
A further result in [59] uses the parametrized set
. . , N , are componentwise convex and continuous functions. These functions are used to define the map G : R n → R M in (5) in the following separable sense, namely
Theorem 4.5. Let θ 1 , . . . , θ N be C 1 -functions and let the GNEP be jointly convex with X given by (5) and G given by (22). Then, with
For refinements of the above two theorems and additional results we refer the reader to [59] . Another way of overestimating SOL(GNEP) is given in [36] . To review this let X y denote the feasible set of the NEP whose ν-th player solves the problem
where y denotes any element from X . 
SOL(VI(X y , F)).
Finally, we would like to direct the reader's attention to [68] , where relations between solutions of a GNEP with shared constraints and the nondominated points of the set X in (4) are provided. This may pave the way to the use of methods from multicriteria optimization for computing of a subset of solutions of the GNEP.
GLOBALLY CONVERGENT ALGORITHMS
The algorithms we present in this section generate a solution of a GNEP under certain assumptions for starting points that are not required to lie close to a solution. From our point of view, these algorithms turned out to be promising under suitable (but possibly restricted) circumstances. There are further interesting approaches which we cannot discuss here, see [44, 53, 55] for some recent ones.
Decomposition methods
Due to the special structure of GNEPs the use of decomposition methods is a very natural approach to find a solution. Two important examples for decomposition methods are a Jacobitype method and a Gauss-Seidel-type method. The idea is the following. Let x k ∈ R n be a given iterate. Then, for each ν = 1, . . . , N , x ν k+1 is determined as best response of player ν to fixed strategies of the other players. Thus, x ν k+1 has to be determined as a solution of the minimization problem
in the case of a Jacobi-type method and of
in the case of a Gauss-Seidel-type method. Now, we describe the latter. The Jacobi-type method uses subproblem (23) instead of (24).
Algorithm 1 (Gauss-Seidel-type Method).
(S0): Choose a starting point x 0 ∈ X (x 0 ). Set k := 0. Unfortunately, despite their practical importance, convergence of Jacobi-type and Gauss-Seideltype methods is hard to prove so that they are used as heuristic methods. Only in some applications convergence of Algorithm 1 can be shown, see [65] for an example. In general, convergence of such methods cannot be expected, even for quite well behaved problems, see [35, Section 3.1] for an example.
However, a regularized version of the Gauss-Seidel-type method is analyzed in [35] and shown below. The subproblems of this method are 
for some forcing function σ :
The definition of a GPG is inspired by [56] , where NEP potential games are introduced. Property Due to the assumptions of the previous theorem, the subproblems (25) are strongly convex optimization problems and have a unique solution so that Algorithm 2 is well defined. The innersemicontinuity requirement for the maps X ν (·) in Theorem 5.1 says that ifx belongs to X and, for any player ν, we consider any sequence {x
This is not a too restrictive requirement, see [35, Section 2] for a discussion.
A further result in [35] is on convergence properties of Algorithm 2 for GPGs that are not necessarily player convex. Then, it is explicitly assumed that the subproblems of Algorithm 2 always have a solution. Furthermore, a special updating rule for the parameters τ k is used. More precisely, τ k+1 in (S3) of Algorithm 2 is computed by
The following theorem summarizes the results of Note that, even if the entire sequence {x k } has an accumulation point the existence of an accumulation point of the subsequence {x k } k∈K is not guaranteed.
Penalty methods
In this subsection we consider GNEPs where, for any ν = 1, . . . , N , the optimization problem of player ν is given by min
with C 1 -functions θ ν : R n → R and g ν : R n → R m ν . Moreover, we assume that, for all
The penalty algorithm that we are going to describe was first proposed in [33] and analyzed in more detail in [29] . The subproblems of the method are NEPs where the ν-th players' optimization problem min
arises from (27) by penalization with a penalty parameter ρ ν > 0. The NEP resulting from concatenating (28) (28) is unconstrained, convex, and nonsmooth. To deal with the nonsmoothness of · γ let the index set
be defined for any x ∈ R n . The penalty method in [29] updates the penalty parameters as follows. For given iterates x and ρ = (ρ 1 , . . . , ρ N ) , the parameter ρ ν with ν ∈ P(x) is replaced by
holds with some fixed c ν ∈ (0, 1). The idea behind this is to increase ρ ν only if the gradient of the penalty term is not sufficiently larger than the gradient of the objective function. Note that the gradient ∇ x ν g ν (x) + γ is well defined due to the definition of P(x). To formulate the penalty method we suppose that there is an iterative algorithm A which, starting from a point x k , determines a new point x k+1 := A[x k ] and so on. Moreover, for any ρ = (ρ 1 , . . . , ρ N ) and any starting point x 0 ∈ R n , Algorithm A is assumed to generate a sequence {x k } whose accumulation points solve PNEP ρ . Now, we are in the position to state the penalty algorithm from [29] .
Algorithm 3 (Penalty Method).
(S0): 
is the primal part of a Fritz John point of problem (27) with x −ν := x * ,−ν but not a global minimizer of (27) , (c) x * ,ν is a global minimizer of (27) with x −ν := x * ,−ν .
Note that I ∞ = ∅ means that all penalty parameters are updated a finite number of times only while I ∞ = ∅ indicates that at least one penalty parameter grows to infinity. A sufficient condition for I ∞ = ∅ (if {x k } is bounded) is the extended Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification (EMFCQ for short). A proof of this assertion can be found in [29, Theorem 2.8] .
A GNEP satisfies the EMFCQ at a point x * if, for every player ν = 1, . . . , N , there is a vector
denotes the index set of all active and violated constraints at the point x * for the ν-th player. In [29] , another constraint qualification (named CQ γ ) is shown to be weaker than EMFCQ but, still, to imply that each accumulation point of a bounded sequence generated by Algorithm 3 solves the GNEP. The definition of CQ γ and references where such a constraint qualification was used in the case of optimization problems can be found in [29] and [31] .
For jointly convex GNEPs with X given in (5) a slight modification of Algorithm 3 is analyzed in [29] under the assumption that G : R n → R M is continuously differentiable. Then, if (S2) of Algorithm 3 is replaced by
Else, set ρ ν,k+1 := ρ ν,k for ν = 1, . . . , N , stronger results than in Theorem 5.3 were proved in [29] . In particular, if the penalty parameters grows to infinity and {x k } is bounded, there is an accumulation point x * of {x k } such that for each ν = 1, . . . , N one of the assertions (b) and (c) from Theorem 5.3 is true. Moreover, it can be shown that Slater's condition for the set X guarantees that the penalty parameters are increased a finite number of times only.
The problem that is left is the choice of an appropriate algorithm A for the solution of a subproblem PNEP ρ . One possibility is to approximate the nonsmooth PNEP ρ by a smooth one, where the ν-th players' optimization problem is given by
with some smoothing parameter ε > 0. The objective of (30) is strongly convex so that (30) always has a unique solution. The resulting NEP is unconstrained, convex and smooth and is denoted by PNEP ρ (ε). Hence, PNEP ρ (ε) can equivalently be written as
where, for each ν, P ν (·, x −ν , ρ ν , ε) denotes the objective function of (30 
is a solution of PNEP ρ . Thus, one possibility to determine x k+1 in (S3) of Algorithm 3 is to perform some steps of an equation solver applied to the equation F ρ k ,ε k (x) = 0 with some ε k > 0 until a certain accuracy is reached. The parameters ε k have to be updated in the outer iterations. For more details on the implementation of Algorithm 3 see [29] .
The penalization approach described above transforms GNEPs into a sequence of NEPs. The same idea can be used in different ways. In [31] , a partial penalization is provided where constraints h ν (x ν ) ≤ 0 that depend only on the ν-th player's variables are not penalized. The subproblems of the resulting algorithm are constrained and nonsmooth NEPs where the ν-th player's optimization problem is
Another partial penalization approach is suggested in [40] , where the nonsmoothness of z + is removed by introducing artificial variables.
Methods based on Nikaido-Isoda functions
In the beginning of this subsection, we consider jointly convex GNEPs where, for any ν = 1, . . . , N , the optimization problem of player ν is given by
with C 1 -functions θ ν : R n → R. At the end of this subsection, the convexity requirements will be weakened.
In order to compute normalized NEs for jointly convex GNEPs, we first exploit Theorem 2.5. The following descent algorithm was established in [74] for treating the unconstrained optimization problem min 
(S4): Set x k+1 := x k + t k d k , k := k + 1 and go to (S1).
A rule for computing ∇V αβ (x) can be found in [74, Theorem 4.3] . According to this and also for computing V αβ (x), it is necessary to determine the solutions y α (x) and y β (x) of two constrained optimization problems (see part (d) of Theorem 2.4 for a definition). Initially, a Barzilai-Borwein step size [4] was implemented in [74] to avoid evaluations of V αβ caused by a line search. Later on, in [19] , the above algorithm with the Armijo line search formula (31) is combined with a locally superlinearly convergent method (see Section 6) . By standard arguments it can be shown that each accumulation point of a sequence {x k } generated by Algorithm 4 is a stationary point of V αβ . Due to Theorem 4.5 of [74] such a point is a normalized NE of the GNEP provided that the gradients of V αβ satisfy the following monotonicity property for all x ∈ R n with y β (x) − y α (x) = 0:
Another way to compute a normalized NE of a jointly convex GNEP is offered by Theorem 2.4. For treating the constrained optimization problem (10), i.e.,
the following algorithm was established and analyzed in [75] . It can be regarded as a relaxation (see [72] ) of the fixed point iteration for solving x = y α (x), see Theorem 2.4.
Algorithm 5 (Relaxation Method).
(S0):
The following theorem presents the results of Theorems 4.1 and 5.1 in [75] . Then, any accumulation point x * of a sequence {x k } generated by Algorithm 5 is a normalized NE of the GNEP.
In [75] it is shown that Assumption (b) of Theorem 5.4 still implies that every accumulation point of {x k } is a normalized NE if the utility functions θ ν are continuous but not necessarily differentiable.
For the remainder of this subsection let us briefly deal with the case of not necessarily jointly convex, but player convex GNEPs. We assume that the feasible sets of the players X ν (x −ν ) are given by (1) with componentwise convex functions g ν (·, x −ν ). According to Theorem 2.6,
is a suitable unconstrained optimization reformulation for player convex GNEPs. Under certain conditions,V αβ is a piecewise continuously differentiable function, see [18] for details. In the latter paper (and in [17] for the jointly convex case), a robust gradient sampling algorithm [9] is used to minimizeV αβ . In general, one can only expect to obtain a stationary point ofV αβ . However, as it is clear from Theorem 2.6, a global minimizer ofV αβ is needed to obtain a NE. Therefore, it might be interesting to find conditions on the GNEP under which a stationary point ofV αβ turns out to be a global minimizer.
In [18] , also a constrained optimization reformulation for player convex GNEPs was suggested and analyzed. More in detail, for α > 0,V α and W according to (8) and (6), the problem
is considered. In particular smoothness properties are analyzed in [18] and [45] . SinceV α need not be defined outside W a feasible direction algorithm for solving this problem is used in [45] .
We would like to underline that the above two optimization reformulations (32) and (33) for player convex and, consequently, also for jointly convex GNEPs allow a complete characterization of all NEs (see Theorem 2.6 with Proposition 1.2 and Theorem 2.3) and not only of normalized NEs as it was possible by Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 in the case of exclusively jointly convex GNEPs.
Potential reduction algorithm
This section is devoted to an algorithm for the solution of the KKT system (13) of a GNEP. We assume that the feasible sets of the players ν = 1, . . . , N are given by (1) . Moreover, let the functions θ ν and g ν be C 2 for all ν = 1, . . . , N .
The KKT system (13) can be reformulated by (15) , i.e., by the constrained system of equations
with H , z, and defined in (15) . Due to our differentiability assumptions, H is a C 1 -function.
The Potential Reduction Algorithm we are going to describe below is an interior point method and based on the minimization of a potential function. Such a method was firstly proposed in [58] for the solution of constrained nonlinear systems. In [16] , it is applied to find a solution of (15) . Before we state the algorithmic framework let us provide some notation. Let the function p : R n × R 2m ++ → R be given by
for some ζ > m. Furthermore, the set of all strictly feasible points for which the last 2m components of H are positive is denoted by
Now, the potential function ψ : I → R is defined by 
and go to (S1).
The following convergence result is Theorem 4.3 from [16] . A proof can be found there.
Theorem 5.5. Assume that J H (z)
is nonsingular for all z ∈ I . Let {z k } be any sequence generated by Algorithm 6. Then the following assertions hold:
(b) Any accumulation point of {z k } is a solution of (15).
The nonsingularity of J H (z) on I guarantees that Algorithm 6 is well defined since all iterates z k belong to I . This follows from z 0 ∈ I and the step size rule in (S3). By definition of I , none of the solutions of H (z) = 0 can belong to I . Thus, the nonsingularity of J H (z) on I does not imply the nonsingularity of J H at a KKT point. In [16, 30] some sufficient conditions for J H (z) to be nonsingular on I are provided. Moreover, [16] contains discussions on the numerical behavior of the potential reduction method and numerical results. In [30] , the potential reduction method is used for the solution of quasi-variational inequalities and results from [16] are extended to that case.
LOCAL METHODS AND GLOBALIZATIONS
According to the reformulations described in Section 2, related local methods with superlinear convergence can be found in literature. At first let us briefly consider the "partial" reformulation of a jointly convex GNEP by means of the variational inequality VI(X, F) where F is defined by (7) (see Theorem 2.2). For iteratively solving VI(X, F), the Josephy-Newton method [51] can be exploited (see, e.g., [48] and [41] ). This method generates a sequence of vectors {x k } where x k+1 is a solution of the simpler problem VI(X, F k ) and F k denotes the linearization of F at x k , i.e.,
Local quadratic convergence of the Josephy-Newton method is proved under strong assumptions.
Methods based on Nikaido-Isoda functions
In this subsection we consider jointly convex GNEPs. For any ν = 1, . . . , N , the optimization problem of player ν is given by
where θ 1 , . . . , θ N : R n → R and G : R n → R M are C 2 -functions with locally Lipschitz continuous second-order derivatives.
Let us first describe a locally superlinearly convergent counterpart of the globally convergent Algorithm 4 for dealing with the problem of minimizing V αβ (x) over R n . The following algorithm is a nonsmooth Newton method from [69] applied to the system ∇V αβ (x) = 0. Here, Clarke's generalized Jacobian of ∇V αβ is denoted by ∂ 2 V αβ . 
(S3): Set x k+1 := x k + d k , k := k + 1 and go to (S1).
Let x * be a normalized NE. Hence, x * is a solution of the system ∇V αβ (x) = 0. To apply the main convergence result of [69] semismoothness of ∇V αβ at x * and the nonsingularity of all elements in ∂ 2 V αβ (x * ) are needed. In [73] , it is shown that ∇V αβ is semismooth in a neighborhood of x * if the linear independence constraint qualification (LICQ) is satisfied in x * . LICQ means that the gradients ∇G i (x * ) with i ∈ I 0 (x * ) = {i ∈ {1, · · · , M} | G i (x * ) = 0} are linearly independent. Putting things from [73] and [69] together we have For
Step (S2) of Algorithm 7 it is suggested [73] to computeH k := ∇ 2 V αβ (x k ) with some suitablex k ≈ x k instead of an element of ∂ 2 V αβ (x k ). Moreover, it is shown that the convergence properties of Algorithm 7 stay true for the resulting inexact method.
Combining Algorithms 4 and 7 global convergence can be obtained by taking the Newtondirection whenever available and if it satisfies a suitable descent condition. Later on, this technique will be described in detail for the globalization of the following locally superlinear method for treating jointly convex GNEPs where the players' problems are given by (34) .
In [76] , Newton-type methods were applied to the equation 
In contrast to Algorithm 7, the computable generalized Jacobian ∂ C α described in [76] is employed. To define ∂ C α (x) the constant rank constraint qualification (CRCQ) is used. The CRCQ is satisfied in x ∈ X if there is δ > 0 so that, for any subset J ⊆ I 0 (x), the matrices (· · · ∇G i (w) · · · ) i∈J have the same rank r(J) for all w ∈ B δ (x).
Suppose that, for some x ∈ R n , CRCQ is satisfied in y α (x). Then, it is well known [50] that there is a (not necessarily unique) Lagrange multiplier vector ∈ R M so that (y α (x), ) solves the KKT system of the optimization problem (35) :
Let L I (x) denote the set of all subsets J ⊆ I 0 (y α (x)) for which ∈ R M exists such that (y α (x), ) solves (36), j = 0 for all j ∈ I 0 (y α (x)) \ J, and the gradients ∇G i (y α (x)) are linearly independent for all i ∈ J. From a result in [76] it follows that L I (x) is nonempty if Global convergence can be obtained by combining (see [19] ) the globally convergent Gradient Algorithm 4 and the current local algorithm (here Algorithm 8) by taking the Newton-direction whenever available and if it satisfies a certain descent condition (see the tests in steps (S3) and (S4) of the following algorithm). 
Algorithm 9 (Globalized
(S6): Set x k+1 := x k + t k d k , k := k + 1 and go to (S1). 
Methods based on KKT conditions
This section is devoted to local algorithms for the solution of the KKT system (13) of a GNEP. Global convergence can be obtained by line search techniques or by a combination with the The LP-Newton Method was designed for solving general constrained equations with nonisolatedTheorem 6.4 (see [15] Global convergence results should also be possible for a modification of Algorithm 10 where the Potential Reduction Algorithm is replaced by the Penalty Method described in Section 5.2. The player convexity and regularity conditions required there for proving convergence to a solution of the GNEP would make Theorem 6.4 also valid for the case that "solution of (15)" is replaced by "solution of the GNEP". This is justified by Theorem 2.7.
We finally would like to refer the reader to an approach in [14] , where a Newton-like method is applied to F 2 (x, γ ) = 0 (see Subsection 4.1) in order to find a Fritz-John point of a GNEP. The local quadratic convergence of this method is claimed under quite strong conditions if it starts sufficiently close to a solution (x * , γ * ) of F 2 (x, γ ) = 0. In particluar, all multipliers in γ * were required to be nonzero. As explained in [14] there is some hope to weaken those conditions.
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